While prior to the global financial crisis, the empirical international capital flow literature has focused on net capital flows (the current account), since the crisis there has been an increased focus on gross flows. In this paper we jointly analyze global drivers of gross flows (outflows plus inflows) and net flows (outflows minus inflows) by estimating a latent factor model. We find evidence of two global factors, which we call the GFC (global financial cycle) factor and a commodity price factor as they closely track respectively the Miranda-Agrippino and Rey asset price factor and an average of oil and gas prices. These factors together account for half the variance of gross flows in advanced countries and forty percent of the variance of gross flows in emerging markets. But remarkably, they also account for forty percent of the variance of net capital flows in both groups of countries. We also analyze the heterogeneity across countries in the impact of the two factors. One of the key findings is that the impact of the GFC factor on both gross and net capital flows is stronger in countries that have larger net debt liabilities. Other asset classes (FDI and portfolio equity) do not significantly impact the exposure to the GFC factor.
Introduction
Until the global …nancial crisis of 2008-2009 the empirical literature on international capital ‡ows has been mainly focused on net capital ‡ows, which equal the current account. A substantial literature focuses on the drivers and consequences of large changes in the current account, either in the form of large net in ‡ows (capital ‡ow bonanzas) or large net out ‡ows (sudden stops). 1 Both have signi…cant consequences for the real economy in terms of growth, in ‡ation, asset prices, exchange rates and …nancial crises that have been extensively documented. However, after the global …nancial crisis there has been a shift in the empirical capital ‡ows literature towards a focus on gross capital ‡ows, which include capital in ‡ows (purchases of domestic assets by foreigners), capital out ‡ows (purchases of foreign assets by domestic investors) as well as their sum. 2 There are several reasons for this shift in focus. Gross external assets and liabilities have increased enormously in many countries since the early nineties. The run-up of large gross positions leads to the risk that these positions may be suddenly unwound in the future. In addition, the global …nancial crisis itself saw an unprecedented global retrenchment with sharp simultaneous declines in both capital in ‡ows and out ‡ows. Forbes and Warnock (2012) , one of the …rst papers to shift the focus to gross ‡ows, argue that the strong link between gross and net ‡ows that used to exist has weakened as in ‡ows and out ‡ows co-move more strongly than they used to. As a result, we see an increased volatility of gross ‡ows without a higher volatility of net ‡ows. The recent literature has aimed to understand what factors drive these gross capital ‡ows. While the increased interest in gross ‡ows makes sense, so does the focus on net ‡ows in the literature before the global …nancial crisis. Net capital in ‡ows are equal the excess of national consumption and investment over disposable income, which naturally leads to strong business cycle consequences of large changes in net ‡ows. This in turn can lead to challenges for policy makers. The aim of this paper is to analyze the global drivers of gross and net ‡ows jointly, in a way connecting the older capital ‡ow literature that analyzes the drivers of net ‡ows with the more recent one that focuses on drivers of gross ‡ows. From hereon we will de…ne gross ‡ows as out ‡ows plus in ‡ows and net ‡ows as out ‡ows minus in ‡ows. From a pure accounting perspective gross and net ‡ows may or may not be related. An equal increase in in ‡ows and out ‡ows raises gross ‡ows, but does not a¤ect net ‡ows. But an increase in out ‡ows and a smaller increase in in ‡ows raises both gross and net ‡ows. Davis and van Wincoop (2018) 1 develop a model where gross and net ‡ows are uncorrelated, with global shocks driving gross ‡ows and relative shocks (shocks in Home relative to Foreign country) driving net ‡ows. But the model has only two countries, which are perfectly symmetric. More generally, in a multi-country model with asymmetries across countries, global shocks will a¤ect both gross and net ‡ows.
In general the connection between gross and net ‡ows is an empirical matter. We therefore ask whether global drivers of gross ‡ows also have a signi…cant e¤ect on net ‡ows. If this is the case, there are clear policy consequences as signi…cant net ‡ows generally impact the real economy. It has led Rey (2013) to argue that countries may need to choose between monetary autonomy and international …nancial integration. 3 While the global drivers themselves are outside of the control of individual countries, they may be able to take action that a¤ects their exposure to these global drivers, such as imposing capital controls. We will therefore also investigate what drives the heterogeneity across countries of the impact of global drivers on gross and net capital ‡ows. We analyze capital ‡ows of a broad set of 58 countries over the period 1996-2015. This is the period over which gross capital ‡ows in many countries have become very volatile. For the median advanced country gross capital ‡ows were six times as volatile as net ‡ows during this period. In order to identify the global factors, we estimate a static factor model for capital in ‡ows and out ‡ows of the 58 countries. Both in ‡ows and out ‡ows are driven by the same global factors. This allows us to analyze the impact of these global factors on both gross ‡ows, adding the factor loadings for out ‡ows and in ‡ows, and net ‡ows, taking the di¤erence in the factor loadings for out ‡ows and in ‡ows.
We …nd evidence of two global factors, which we refer to as the GFC (global …nancial cycle) factor and the commodity price factor. The GFC factor is highly correlated with the asset price factor that Miranda-Aggrippino and Rey (2018) estimate to measure the global …nancial cycle. It represents a common component in 858 asset price series. The global …nancial cycle in turn has been shown to be highly correlated with center country economic conditions, such as US monetary policy, growth, banking leverage and asset price risk (VIX). The high correlation of our …rst global capital ‡ows factor with the Miranda-Aggrippino and Rey (MAR) asset price factor is noteworthy as the latter is identi…ed by very di¤erent means and with very di¤erent data. MAR use a dynamic factor model with daily …nancial asset price data, while we use a static factor model with annual capital ‡ow quantity data. We refer to the second global capital ‡ows factor as the commodity price factor as it is highly correlated with (and closely tracks) the average of world oil and gas prices.
These two global factors together explain about half of the variance of gross ‡ows of advanced countries and forty percent of the variance of gross ‡ows of emerging markets. They therefore play a central role as drivers of gross capital ‡ow volatility over the past two decades. But the key …nding is that these same global factors also account for about forty percent of the variance in net capital ‡ows in both advanced countries and emerging markets. Clearly therefore, these global drivers do not simply lead in ‡ows and out ‡ows of countries to ‡uctuate in unison. By having such an important impact on net ‡ows, they will generally have signi…cant business cycle implications as well that policy makers will aim to mitigate.
The fact that the commodity price factor has an important e¤ect on net capital ‡ows is perhaps not surprising as there is obvious heterogeneity across countries with respect to fuel exports, imports and consumption. But we …nd that the GFC factor on average contributes equally to the variance of net capital ‡ows as the commodity price factor and for advanced countries is a more important driver of the variance of net ‡ows. This suggests signi…cant heterogeneities across countries associated with …nancial sector exposures that lead to net capital ‡ows in response to global swings in risk perception or risk aversion.
The heterogeneity across countries that leads to net capital ‡ows in response to global shocks is directly related to heterogeneity of the factor loadings. If the factor loadings were the same for all countries, they would also be the same for in ‡ows and out ‡ows as world net ‡ows are zero. In that case global factors would not have any e¤ect on net ‡ows. Consistent with the important impact of the global factors on net capital ‡ows, we …nd signi…cant heterogeneity of the factor loadings. In order to understand what drives this heterogeneity, we regress the factor loadings on a wide range of variables associated with …nancial and trade integration, macroeconomic policy, macroeconomic conditions, institutional quality, …nancial development, risk and the exchange rate system. One of the key …ndings is that the impact of the global …nancial cycle factor on both gross and net capital ‡ows is stronger in countries that have larger net debt liabilities, where debt refers to banking and portfolio debt. Other asset classes (FDI and portfolio equity) do not signi…cantly impact the exposure to the GFC factor. The paper is related to a small recent literature that estimates latent factor models for capital ‡ows, as well as the literature on push and pull factors of capital ‡ows and the recent literature on the high and rising correlation between capital in ‡ows and out ‡ows. We will brie ‡y review these related literatures in Section 2. After that, the remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3 discusses the data and some descriptive moments. Section 4 describes our factor analysis. Section 5 discusses the importance of the global factors identi…ed in Section 4 for both gross and net capital ‡ows. Section 6 sheds light on the drivers of the heterogeneity in the factor loadings across countries for both gross and net capital ‡ows. Section 7 brie ‡y discusses the sensitivity of the results to the data frequency. While we use annual data in most of the paper, here we discuss how results are a¤ected by using quarterly data. Section 8 concludes.
Related Literature
The paper relates to a small recent literature of latent factor models applied to international capital ‡ows. This includes Cerutti et al. (2017) , Barrot and Serven (2018) , Sarno et al. (2016) and Cerutti, Claessens and Puy (2015) . The approach we take here di¤ers from these papers in several respects. The most important di¤erence is that we consider simultaneously the impact of global factors on aggregate gross and net capital ‡ows. None of these other papers do this. Sarno et al. (2016) estimate a factor model for high frequency net bilateral equity and bond ‡ows, but do not analyze gross ‡ows or aggregate net ‡ows (the current account). 4 The three other papers only analyze gross ‡ows.
A related di¤erence relates to the factor model itself assumed in these papers. Cerutti et al. (2017) estimate both static and dynamic factor models. They estimate global factors separately for each component of capital ‡ows (FDI ‡ows, debt ‡ows, equity ‡ows, credit ‡ows), for in ‡ows and out ‡ows, and for advanced and emerging economies. Cerutti, Claessens and Puy (2015) estimate a dynamic factor model for capital in ‡ows to emerging markets that includes a common factor and region-speci…c factors. The factors again vary across components of capital ‡ows. Sarno et al. (2016) estimate a dynamic factor model for US equity and bond net bilateral ‡ows that includes a global factor, a destination-country factor and an asset-speci…c factor (equity versus bonds). Barrot and Serven (2018) estimate a factor model that includes a global factor and factors for three groups of countries (advanced, emerging and developing). As in the other papers, the global factor is estimated separately for capital in ‡ows and out ‡ows. Our approach di¤ers in several ways. First, we estimate global factors that are the same for capital in ‡ows and out ‡ows. This way we can consider the simultaneous impact of the global factors on gross ‡ows and net ‡ows. It is impossible to do this if the global factors are di¤erent for in ‡ows and out ‡ows. Second, we allow for generally more than one global factor (and in fact …nd two signi…cant ones). 5 Third, we do not allow for additional factors, such as region-speci…c factors or emerging market/advanced country factors. Factors that have a signi…cant e¤ect on advanced country net capital ‡ows by construction must also have a signi…cant e¤ect on net capital ‡ows of other countries. Limiting factors to certain groups of countries is therefore problematic, especially when considering net capital ‡ows. We therefore only consider global latent factors.
In this paper we will use annual data for aggregate capital in ‡ows and out ‡ows. With the exception of Barrot and Serven (2018) , the papers mentioned above use higher frequency data and consider components of capital ‡ows. Cerutti et al. (2017) and Cerutti, Claessens and Puy (2015) use quarterly FDI ‡ows, debt ‡ows, equity ‡ows and banking ‡ows for a large number of countries, while Sarno et al. (2016) use monthly bilateral US equity and bond out ‡ows. We use annual rather than quarterly data as this reduces measurement error. We have computed all our results for quarterly data as well, but the larger measurement error at the quarterly frequency weakens the common component of capital ‡ows across countries. Sarno et al. (2016) use even more high frequency monthly data, but these are based on relatively high quality TIC data that are only available for the United States. In addition we only report results for aggregate capital ‡ows rather than their components as there is signi…cant substitution among asset classes. We will illustrate that this substitution weakens the common component across countries for a particular asset class, making global drivers appear less important than they are. We should also point out that the business cycle impacts of capital ‡ows tend to operate through the current account, which is equal to total net in ‡ows across all asset classes.
Another related literature regresses capital ‡ows on various observable push and pull factors. While there is a signi…cant literature that considers the impact of push and pull factors on net capital ‡ows, the recent literature has considered the impact of these factors on capital in ‡ows and out ‡ows separately, as well as components of capital in ‡ows and out ‡ows. There is signi…cant evidence that global push factors such as global risk (VIX), global growth, global liquidity and global bank leverage are important drivers of global capital ‡ows. Forbes and Warnock (2012) show that global push factors, in particular global risk, can lead to large changes in capital in ‡ows and out ‡ows (surges and stops for in ‡ows and ‡ight and retrenchment for out ‡ows). Broner et al. (2013) …nd that during global crises capital in ‡ows and out ‡ows both collapse. Avdjiev et al. (2017) develop a dataset that distinguishes between banks, corporates and sovereigns. They …nd that a positive global credit shocks raises in ‡ows to and out ‡ows from domestic banks and corporates, while having little e¤ect on sovereigns. Bruno and Shin (2015) focus on banking ‡ows and …nd that global push factors such as global bank leverage and global bank equity growth are important.
These literatures have also identi…ed evidence of heterogeneity across countries in their sensitivity to global factors. Barrot and Serven (2018) …nd that capital ‡ows are more sensitive to the global factor in countries with greater …nancial openness, deeper …nancial systems and more rigid exchange rate systems. Fratzscher (2012) uses high frequency data on net ‡ows to …nd that the exposure to global push factors depends on the quality of institutions, country risk and the strength of domestic macro fundamentals. Milesi-Ferretti and Tille (2011) focus on the decline in gross capital ‡ows during the Great Recession. They …nd that countries with a larger sum of banking assets plus liabilities, and larger net liabilities in debt instruments, experienced sharper declines in capital in ‡ows and out ‡ows.
Finally, the paper is related to a literature on the correlation between capital in ‡ows and out ‡ows. Broner et.al. (2013) document a high and increasing correlation between capital in ‡ows and out ‡ows. Davis and van Wincoop (2018) show empirically and theoretically that this is related to an increase in global …nancial integration, while trade integration weakens the correlation between capital in ‡ows and out ‡ows. The higher correlation between in ‡ows and out ‡ows implies a greater volatility of gross ‡ows relative to net ‡ows. Davis and van Wincoop (2018) document that in advanced countries the standard deviation of net ‡ows relative to GDP has not changed much when comparing the period 1975-1989 to 1990-2015, while the volatility of gross ‡ows relative to GDP almost tripled on average. The latter is consistent with the growing stock of external assets and liabilities relative to GDP, which has tripled across these two periods for the average advanced country. Avdjiev et al. (2017) argue that banking ‡ows are a critical driver of the increasing correlation between capital in ‡ows and out ‡ows.
Data and Descriptive Moments

Country and Time Coverage
Our sample consist of annual capital ‡ows data for 58 countries over the 1996-2015 period. The full list of countries is presented in Table 1 . There are 20 advanced countries and 38 emerging markets. 6 The sample covers 81 percent of global external assets and liabilities and 74 percent of world GDP in 1996. 7 It contains all the major industrialized countries, a broad set of emerging markets that includes all the major ones such as China, Russia and India, as well as the countries that experienced the largest capital ‡ow reversals during the global …nancial crisis, such as Iceland and the Baltic states. We do not include many small developing countries as these economies tend to be relatively …nancially closed and would 6 The latter include a couple of developing countries. But since most of these countries are emerging markets, we will refer to them that way. 7 Here we exclude from the world total the countries or territories classi…ed by the IMF sta¤ as o¤shore …nancial centers: Andorra, Anguilla, Aruba, the Bahamas, Belize, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Cook Islands, Cyprus, Gibraltar, Guernsey, Isle of Man, Jersey, Liechtenstein, Macao, Malaysia, Monaco, Montserrat, Netherlands Antilles, Palau, Panama, Samoa, Seychelles, Turks and Caicos Islands, Vanuatu.
bias the overall results.
The sample period is chosen to include the last two decades for two reasons. First, prior to this period the global …nancial landscape was dramatically di¤erent, with much smaller levels of external assets and liabilities and capital ‡ows, especially for advanced countries. We like to have a sample that is representative of the current state of global …nancial integration. Second, if we started the sample before the mid-1990s, we would lose Russia and most of the Eastern European countries. 8 The use of annual data also has a double motivation. The …rst is simply data availability. Using data at a quarterly frequency would mean losing a handful of the emerging market countries in the sample, in particular China. The second reason is that capital ‡ow data tends to be very noisy, especially at a quarterly frequency. Using an annual frequency helps eliminate a lot of this noise. 9 However, in the Online Appendix we replicate all the results for quarterly data. In Section 7 we brie ‡y discuss these results. The capital ‡ow data is from the IMF's International Financial Statistics (IFS). We focus our attention on aggregate capital in ‡ows and out ‡ows. As discussed above, others often consider components of aggregate ‡ows: FDI ‡ows, debt ‡ows, equity ‡ows, banking ‡ows and reserve accumulation. This tends to lower the correlation of capital ‡ows across countries and correspondingly weaken the role of common global drivers. This is the result of substitution between the various components. The full list of variables and data sources is presented in the data appendix.
De…nition of Variables
First de…ne OF i;t to be aggregate out ‡ows out of country i and IF i;t to be aggregate in ‡ows into country i. We de…ne net ‡ows as the di¤erence between out ‡ows and in ‡ows and gross ‡ows as the sum of out ‡ows and in ‡ows:
Net ‡ows can change without a change in gross ‡ows and gross ‡ows can change without a change in net ‡ows. But they may also be related. For example, a rise in out ‡ows without a change in in ‡ows raises both gross and net ‡ows. Putting data measurement problems aside, net out ‡ows are also equal to the current account.
World out ‡ows, in ‡ows and gross ‡ows are computed by summing over the corresponding ‡ows for all countries in the sample. They are denoted respectively OF w;t , IF w;t and GF w;t . Although world out ‡ows are equal to world in ‡ows, this is not exactly the case in the data due to measurement error and incomplete country coverage. We also de…ne IF adv;t and OF adv;t as the sum across all the advanced countries and IF eme;t and OF eme;t as the sum across all the emerging markets.
We denote capital ‡ows normalized by the sum of external assets and liabilities as lowercase, so if i;t = 100
where (A + L) i;t is the sum of the stocks of external assets and liabilities in country i. Normalized world capital ‡ows are if w;t = 100 IFw;t (A+L)w;t and of w;t = 100
OFw;t (A+L)w;t , where (A+L) w;t is the sum of the stock of external assets and liabilities across all countries in the sample. Normalized world gross ‡ows are then gf w;t = of w;t +if w;t .
The reason for dividing capital in ‡ows and out ‡ows by external assets and liabilities is that these ‡ows correspond to changes in external assets and liabilities (abstracting from valuation e¤ects). As the magnitude of external assets and liabilities increases, one may expect the size and volatility of the corresponding ‡ows to increase as well. Dividing by external assets plus liabilities is therefore a natural way to make sure that the series are stationary. While gross ‡ows can be expected to rise in magnitude with the stock of external assets and liabilities, this is not necessarily the case for net ‡ows, which by construction are equal to the current account and are therefore constrained by trade ‡ows. For net ‡ows we therefore also report some results when scaling by GDP, which is also a more natural measure when we are concerned with the business cycle impact of net ‡ows. Net ‡ows scaled by GDP is denoted nf gdp i;t = 100 Figure 1 shows charts for out ‡ows, in ‡ows, gross ‡ows and net ‡ows (scaled both ways) for the aggregate of advanced countries and emerging markets. Overall the magnitude of ‡uctuations of the scaled out ‡ows, in ‡ows and gross ‡ows is similar for the two groups of countries. But one should keep in mind that since these ‡ows are scaled by external assets and liabilities, which on average are almost four times as big in the advanced countries, the magnitude of these capital ‡ows is substantially larger in advanced countries than in emerging markets if we were to scale by GDP.
A First Look at the Data
The sharp drop in gross ‡ows during the global …nancial crisis is clearly visible for both advanced countries and emerging markets. Especially emerging markets experienced a significant rise in gross ‡ows prior to the …nancial crisis. Neither advanced countries nor emerging markets have seen their level of gross ‡ows recover to levels just prior to the global …nancial crisis. Figure 1 shows that net ‡ows are very small for the aggregate of advanced countries when scaled by external assets and liabilities. This is both because advanced countries make up the largest part of the world (and world net ‡ows are zero) and because external assets and liabilities of advanced countries are very large. Scaling by GDP, we see that emerging markets and advanced countries display opposite patterns of net ‡ows. During the …rst half of the sample, up to the global …nancial crisis, net out ‡ows increased in emerging markets and decreased in advanced countries. This means that capital ‡owed on net from emerging markets towards advanced countries. This was reversed after the crisis.
Turning now to the data for individual countries, Table 2 presents some statistics for the level and standard deviation of out ‡ows, in ‡ows, gross ‡ows, and net ‡ows (scaled both ways). The table presents the simple average, median, 25th and 75th percentiles across the groups of advanced countries and emerging markets. The ratio of the stock of external assets and liabilities to GDP is reported as well.
The level and volatility of out ‡ows, in ‡ows and gross ‡ows scaled by external assets and liabilities is broadly similar in advanced countries as in emerging markets. This is not the case for net ‡ows. When scaling by external assets and liabilities, net ‡ows are almost 3 times as volatile in emerging markets. This is the result of the much higher ratio of external assets and liabilities to GDP in advanced countries, shown in the last row of the table. When scaling by GDP, net ‡ows have a more similar volatility across the two groups. The standard deviation of net ‡ows relative to GDP is 3.47 for the median advanced country versus 3.77 for the median emerging market. Table 3 provides a …rst look at the global capital ‡ows cycle. The table shows how out‡ows, in ‡ows, gross ‡ows, net ‡ows (scaled both ways) are correlated with world gross ‡ows. It also reports the R 2 of regressions of these variables on world gross ‡ows. Remarkably, for the median advanced country the correlation between gross ‡ows and world gross ‡ows is 0.7. For emerging markets the median correlation is a much weaker 0.22. The R 2 of a regression of gross ‡ows on world gross ‡ows is simply the square of this correlation. It tells us that for the medium advanced country a very large 50 percent of the variance of gross capital ‡ows can be explained by world gross ‡ows. For the median emerging market only 12 percent of the variance of gross capital ‡ows can be explained by world gross ‡ows. So half of the variance of gross ‡ows of the median advanced country can be explained by global gross ‡ows. This is signi…cantly larger than in Cerutti et.al. (2017) . The main di¤erences are that they use quarterly data and components of capital ‡ows. When we use quarterly data over our same sample, the median R 2 drops to 0.28 for advanced countries.
If in addition we consider the components of capital ‡ows, the median drops further to 0.10 (FDI), 0.15 (portfolio ‡ows) and 0.18 (banking ‡ows). Table 3 also provides some information about the impact of the world gross capital ‡ows cycle on net ‡ows. One should keep in mind that world net ‡ows are by construction zero. So the sign of the correlation with world gross ‡ows will necessarily vary across countries.
If an increase in world gross ‡ows leads to a rise in net out ‡ows of some countries, it must necessarily lead to a drop in net out ‡ows of other countries. It is therefore not surprising that the average correlation between net ‡ows (scaled both ways) and world gross ‡ows is close to zero for both advanced countries and emerging markets. More interesting is the variation across countries, which is considerable, indicating that changes in world gross ‡ows are associated substantial changes in net ‡ows as well. This can be seen by looking at the 25th and 75th percentiles in Table 3 . For example, the correlation of net ‡ows scaled by GDP with world gross ‡ows varies from -0.28 to 0.29 for the middle half of advanced countries and from -0.21 to 0.42 for the middle half of emerging markets. Figure 3 ). This is the case for both advanced countries and emerging markets. The absolute size of these correlations is not systematically di¤erent between advanced countries and emerging markets.
These correlations are substantial. For countries with a positive correlation (including most Latin American countries and India, China, Russia), the average is 0.36. For countries with a negative correlation (including Eastern and Southern European countries, and the US), the average is -0.31.
Factor Analysis
In the last section we simply de…ned the global capital ‡ows cycle as world gross ‡ows. We saw that world gross ‡ows are highly correlated with gross ‡ows of many individual countries, but also with net ‡ows of many countries. In this section, instead of simply de…ning the global capital ‡ows cycle as world gross ‡ows, we will identify global factors that are drivers of capital in ‡ows and out ‡ows. We will then analyze the impact of these global factors on both gross and net ‡ows of individual countries. We …rst describe the static factor model that we will use and the selection of the number of factors. After that we discuss the nature of the global factors that we identify, which we tie to the global …nancial cycle and the commodity price cycle. In the next section we discuss the impact of the global factors on gross and net capital ‡ows of individual countries.
Static Factor Model
For now we write the model with a general number k factors:
is a k 1 vector of factor loadings and F t is a 1 k vector of global factors. Note that unlike the Barrot and Serven (2018) and Cerutti et al. (2017) , the vector of factors F t is common to both out ‡ows and in ‡ows. This has the advantage that we can analyze the impact of the global factors on both gross and net ‡ows. Also, in contrast to other factor models for capital ‡ows, we do not include factors that are speci…c to certain groups of countries such as advanced countries, emerging markets or groups identi…ed by region. If there is an important capital ‡ow driver for a speci…c group of countries, it will generally contribute to net capital ‡ows of that group. But this corresponds to opposite net capital ‡ows of other groups of countries, so that the factor must ultimately impact other countries as well.
De…ne of i and if i as T 1 vectors that stack the country-period scalars of i;t out i and if i;t in i . We can then compactly write the factor model as
where y is a T 2n matrix that stacks the matrices y i = [of i if i ] for the n countries side by side. is a k 2n matrix that stacks the matrices i = out i in i
side by side. F is a T k matrix that contains the factors F t .
Compute the variance matrix of y, V = y 0 y:
Through an eigenvalue decomposition of the matrix V we can identify the diagonal matrix of 2n eigenvalues and their corresponding eigenvectors. The eigenvalues of the covariance matrix of the error terms, 0 , should be small and bounded. The eigenvalues of the covariance matrix of our factors and loadings, 0 F 0 F , should be large. We choose the eigenvectors corresponding to the k largest eigenvalues, and those are our k 2n matrix . The factor analysis gives us a k 2n matrix of loadings of capital in ‡ows and out ‡ows in the n countries on the k factors. The eigenvalue decomposition does not identity the factors themselves, only their variance. To identify the factors, go back to the earlier equation for the T 2n matrix of capital ‡ows, y:
With OLS we we can regress the 1 2n vector of capital in ‡ows and out ‡ows in period t on the matrix of loadings to estimate the values of the k factors in period t.
We use the Bai and Ng (2002) info criterion for factor selection to select the number of factors k. Choi and Leong (2018) replicate the Monte Carlo simulations in the original Bai and Ng paper for small samples (when using annual data, there are 2n = 116 crosssectional observations and T = 20 time-series observations, when replicating the results using quarterly data there are 2n = 100 cross-sectional observations and T = 80 time-series observations). From Bai and Ng (2002), the Bayesian info criterion is given by:
where R is the average share of the variance of each of the 2n observed series in F that is left unexplained by the factor model with k factors. Thus R (k) =
where tr ( 0 ) is the trace of the matrix of residuals from the factor model estimation in equation (5) with k factors, and 2 is the value of R (k) at our maximum number of factors. For the latter we use k = 4, so 2 = R (4).
The logic behind this info criterion is similar to the logic behind the Akaike Info Criterion and Swartz Info Criterion used for lag length selection in time-series models. As the number of factors increases, R (k) falls, and R (k) = 0 when k = 2n. But while the explanatory power of the factor model increases as k increases, the e¢ ciency falls, and the estimates of factors and loadings become less precise as k increases. The second term in the info criterion, also called the penalty function, tries to capture this loss in e¢ ciency. So as k increases, the …rst term in these two info criterion falls but the second term increases. The optimal number of factors is the value of k where the info criterion is minimized. ). The criterion BIC (k) is minimized when k = 2. The …rst two factors explain a little more than one-half of the total variance of out ‡ows and in ‡ows. 10 A time series plot of the two global factors is presented in Figure 4 . The top chart shows the …rst factor, while the bottom chart shows the second factor, both in blue. The two factors are orthogonal, have a zero mean and standard deviation of 1. To help interpret the factors, we also show one additional series in both charts. In the top chart we show the Miranda-Aggrippino and Rey (2018) factor that captures the commonality in 858 asset price series. We refer to it as the MAR factor from hereon. Miranda-Aggrippino and Rey (2018) report it at the monthly frequency. We …rst normalize their monthly factor to have a standard deviation and mean of respectively 1 and 0, and then annualize by taking the average over a year. In the lower chart we show both the second factor and a series that is the average of crude oil and natural gas prices.
Results from Factor Model Estimation
The …rst factor is closely connected to the MAR factor, with a correlation of 0.82. This is the case even though the MAR factor is derived from completely di¤erent data (daily asset price data) and based on a di¤erent methodology (dynamic factor model). The second factor closely tracks the average of world oil and gas prices, with a correlation between the series of 0.89. It should also be noted that the MAR factor, while highly correlated with our …rst factor, is almost uncorrelated with our second factor (correlation of -0.02). Similarly, the oil and gas price, while highly correlated with the second factor, has a correlation of -0.12 with the …rst factor.
We will also refer to the …rst global capital ‡ows factor as the GFC factor. The MAR factor is meant to be a measure of the global …nancial cycle, which MAR interpret as re ‡ecting time-varying global risk aversion. 11 They show that in turn it is strongly in ‡uenced by US monetary policy, with a tightening of US monetary policy leading to a drop in the MAR factor. The high correlation of our …rst global capital ‡ows factor with the MAR factor suggests that it is closely connected with the global …nancial cycle. Moreover, consistent with the strong role of US monetary policy identi…ed by MAR as a driver of the MAR factor, our …rst capital ‡ows factor has a correlation of 0.85 with the US Federal Funds rate. We will similarly also refer to the second global capital ‡ows factor as the commodity price factor because of its close connection to oil and gas prices. 11 It should be said that from a theoretical point of view it is not at all obvious how a global change in risk or risk-aversion would lead to to a global change in capital ‡ows. In fact, in a simple mean-variance portfolio framework a global rise in risk-aversion would lead to an increase in equilibrium expected excess returns on risky assets that leaves equilibrium portfolios unchanged and therefore does not impact capital ‡ows at all. One can complicate the basic framework by introducing higher riskyness of foreign assets through information asymmetries, as well as a cost of deviating from a target portfolio, to generate a decline in external portfolio shares during a global rise in risk-aversion. In this paper though we will not concern ourselves with theoretical mechanisms that may be behind the connection between the global …nancial cycle and global capital ‡ows. 13 
Impact of Global Capital Flow Factors on Gross and Net Capital Flows
We will …rst discuss the impact of the two factors on capital ‡ows for the aggregate of advanced countries and emerging markets. After that we consider the explanatory power for individual countries. Figure 5 shows how much of gross and net capital ‡ows (scaled by A + L) for the aggregate of advanced countries and emerging markets is explained by the two factors. The blue line is the actual measure of gross or net capital ‡ows. The red line shows how much is explained by the GFC factor, while the green line shows how much is explained by the combination of the GFC and commodity price factors. The di¤erence between the red and green line captures the additional contribution of the commodity price factor.
Aggregate of Advanced Countries and Emerging Markets
Clearly, the pattern of both gross and net ‡ows for the aggregate of both groups of countries is well explained by the two factors. The GFC factor is especially important for gross ‡ows of advanced countries, while the commodity price factor explains most of the net ‡ows of emerging markets. The GFC factor is also important as a driver of net ‡ows in advanced countries, accounting for the gradual increase in net capital ‡ows to advanced countries prior to the global …nancial crisis and the subsequent abrupt decline in these net in ‡ows.
For the aggregate of advanced countries we see that virtually all of gross capital ‡ows are fully explained by the GFC factor alone. The lower left chart shows that the GFC factor has a much weaker connection to gross capital ‡ows of emerging markets. For emerging markets the commodity price factor is as important as the GFC factor as a driver of gross ‡ows. The rise in oil and gas prices during the …rst half of the sample contributes to their rise in gross ‡ows, while the subsequent drop in oil and gas prices helps explain the drop in gross ‡ows.
When we look at net capital ‡ows in the two charts to the right, two points stand out. First, the two factors combined account for a lot of the ‡uctuations in net capital ‡ows, especially for emerging markets. The two factors are therefore not just drivers of gross ‡ows. They also have an important impact on net capital ‡ows. Second, for advanced countries the GFC factor contributes most to net ‡ows, while for emerging markets the commodity price factor contributes most to net ‡ows. So for the aggregate of advanced countries the global …nancial cycle is a key driver of both gross and net capital ‡ows, while for the aggregate of emerging market countries the world commodity price cycle is a more important driver of net capital ‡ows and plays an important role in gross ‡ows as well.
Results for Individual Countries
So far we have discussed the impact of the two global capital ‡ow factors on capital ‡ows of the aggregate of the groups of advanced countries and emerging markets. We now turn to the impact on capital ‡ows of individual countries. Consider the factor model form presented earlier in equation (4) for the T 2 matrix of capital in ‡ows and out ‡ows in country i:
where 
Analogously, the goodness of …t of net ‡ows can be found by pre and post-multiplying by
Since by construction, the variance matrix of the factors, F 0 F, is simply the identity matrix, the goodness of …t of factor j in explaining gross ‡ows in country i is Table 5 reports the average fraction of the variance of out ‡ows, in ‡ows, gross ‡ows and net ‡ows that is explained by the two global capital ‡ow factors. Results are shown for all countries, advanced countries and emerging markets.
There are two important takeaways from Table 5 . First, the combination of the two factors can on average explain a large share of the variance of both gross ‡ows and net ‡ows. The two factors account for 51 and 38 percent of the variance of gross ‡ows in the advanced economies and emerging markets, respectively. They account for 36 percent and 39 percent of the variance of net ‡ows of advanced countries and emerging markets. The important role in explaining net capital ‡ows, and therefore the current account, suggests that these global factors may have an important e¤ect on business cycles. In most open economy macro models net ‡ows are driven by asymmetric shocks across countries, while global shocks have no e¤ect on net capital ‡ows. 12 Table 5 relates to the relative importance of the two factors. Overall, for the entire set of countries, the GFC factor is the dominant driver of gross capital ‡ows, while the commodity price factor is an equally important driver of net capital ‡ows. Within advanced countries the GFC factor is clearly most important, especially for gross ‡ows but also for net ‡ows. Within emerging markets the two factors are about equally important, with the GFC factor being somewhat more important for gross ‡ows and the commodity price factor somewhat more important for net ‡ows. The fact that net ‡ows are signi…cantly a¤ected by the two global factors implies substantial heterogeneity across the countries, which is re ‡ected in the heterogeneity of the factor loadings. This heterogeneity of factor loadings in turn translates into heterogeneity in the contribution of the two factors to the variance of gross and net ‡ows. The fraction of the variance that can be explained by both factors is reported for each country in Figures 6 and 7 for respectively gross ‡ows and net ‡ows. The countries in red are the advanced countries, while the countries in blue are the emerging markets. The left chart of Figure 6 shows that the GFC factor is most important for advanced countries and Eastern European countries as a driver of gross ‡ows. But there is signi…cant heterogeneity within both groups of countries. In Iceland over 80 percent of the variance of gross ‡ows is explained by the GFC factor. In the US it is over 70 percent. By contrast, in Canada, another advanced country, virtually none of the variance of gross ‡ows is explained by the GFC factor. In Japan less than 10 percent is explained by the GFC factor. The chart on the right hand side of Figure 6 shows similar heterogeneity for the commodity price factor. Overall this is a more important driver of gross ‡ows for emerging markets. But while in countries like Thailand and Indonesia it accounts for close to 60 percent of the variance of gross ‡ows, in two thirds of the emerging markets it accounts for less than 10 percent of the variance of gross ‡ows.
Similar heterogeneity applies when we look at the contribution of both factors to the variance of net ‡ows, reported in Figure 7 . While in Canada 65 percent of the variance of net ‡ows is explained by the GFC factor, in other advanced countries like Italy, Denmark, the UK and the Netherlands virtually non of the variance of net ‡ows is explained by the GFC factor. With regards to the commodity price factors we see that in emerging markets like Bolivia, Brazil and Fiji well over 60 percent of the variance of net capital ‡ows is explained by the commodity price factor, while in others like Indonesia, Uruguay, Honduras and South Africa virtually none of the variance of net ‡ows is explained by the commodity price factor.
Explaining the Heterogeneity of the Factor Loadings
The results from Figures 6 and 7 suggest that there are important types of heterogeneity across the countries that lead to large di¤erences in factor loadings. The actual factor loadings for individual countries are reported in Tables 6 (advanced countries) and 7 (emerging markets). Statistical signi…cance is reported as well. In this section we will make an attempt to see what types of di¤erences across countries lead to systematic di¤erences in factor loadings. This can potentially have important policy implications. There is generally little that countries can do to in ‡uence the two global factors, but they can certainly take measures to in ‡uence their exposure to these factors.
We should emphasize though that the heterogeneity of the factor loadings reported in Tables 6 and 7 is to some extent caused by measurement error. So some of these di¤erences are not real and we should not expect to account for all of the heterogeneity in estimated factor loadings. Related to this, many of the factor loadings are not statistically signi…cant. If we look at all countries, the GFC factor is statistically signi…cant in 59 percent of the countries for gross ‡ows and 41 percent for net ‡ows. The commodity price factor is signi…cant in 40 percent of the countries for gross ‡ows and 47 percent for net ‡ows.
Heterogeneity GFC Factor Loadings
We will …rst discuss the loadings for the GFC factor. Tables 8 and 9 report results from regressions of the out ‡ow loading For each country, we use the average of each variable over the entire sample. It should be emphasized that these two tables only consider a limited set of dependent variables. We have considered many more variables that we will discuss in Section 6.3 below, but these other variables are generally not statistically signi…cant. Therefore we believe that the main sources of heterogeneity of the factor loadings for the GFC factor are shown in Tables 8 and 9 . Overall the explanatory variables yield an adjusted R 2 of 65 percent for gross ‡ows and 44 percent for net ‡ows (columns 5 and 7 of Table 9 ). In Table 8 we report the results of regressions on two sets of variables. These sets only di¤er in the way we treat external assets and liabilities. In the …rst set we regress on both external assets plus liabilities relative to GDP, (A + L)=GDP , and external assets minus liabilities relative to GDP, (A L)=GDP . These are respectively a measure of …nancial integration and a measure of net external lending (net borrowing when negative). In the second set of variables we separately include both (A + L)=GDP and (A L)=GDP for net lenders (A > L) and net debtors (A < L). The remaining variables are the same for both regressions. There are three policy variables: capital controls, in ‡ation and the fraction of years that the country had a …xed exchange rate system. There are two trade variables: exports plus imports relative to GDP (a measure of trade integration) and exports minus imports (the trade account) relative to GDP. The other variables are per capita GDP, an Eastern European dummy and a Latin American dummy. Dummies for other regions (Western Europe, Asia-Paci…c and other) are not statistically signi…cant and not included. Table 9 is analogous to Table 8 , except that we break down A + L and A L into three components: debt (banking and portfolio debt), portfolio equity and FDI. We also report results when we include the gross and net positions for debt, (A + L) debt and (A L) debt , separately for countries that are net lenders in debt assets and net borrowers in debt assets. It should be pointed out that on average 72 percent of debt assets and liabilities are banking assets and liabilities.
In what follows one should keep in mind that the average capital out ‡ow, in ‡ow and gross ‡ow loadings are positive, while the average net ‡ow loading is close to zero. A positive coe¢ cient of a variable for the out ‡ow, in ‡ow and gross ‡ow loadings therefore implies that a higher value of the variable makes the country more sensitive to the global …nancial cycle. A positive value for the net ‡ow loading implies that a higher value of the variable raises net out ‡ows when the GFC factor improves.
The measure of …nancial integration in Table 8 , (A + L)=GDP , is strongly signi…cant for the out ‡ow and gross ‡ow loading, but not for the in ‡ow and net ‡ow loading. Moreover, this signi…cance comes entirely from countries that are net debtors. The positive coe¢ cient implies that net debtor countries that are more …nancially integrated tend to be more sensitive to the GFC factor. The net foreign asset position A L is always strongly signi…cant. Moreover, this is again a result of countries that have a net external debt. It is insigni…cant for countries that are net creditors. A larger net external debt L A implies that out ‡ows, in ‡ows and gross ‡ows are more sensitive to the GFC factor, while net out ‡ows will rise more when the GFC factor deteriorates. The latter implies that the larger the net external debt of a country, the more net borrowing declines when the GFC factor deteriorates, as during the global …nancial crisis.
The results in Table 9 con…rm these …ndings and show that they are fully the result of the exposure to debt assets and liabilities. Gross and net exposures to portfolio equity and FDI do not a¤ect the sensitivity of capital ‡ows to the GFC factor. Exposure to debt assets and liabilities do, but only if a country is a net borrower in debt assets. For those countries, larger net liabilities in debt assets lead to increased sensitivity of capital out ‡ows, in ‡ows and gross ‡ows to the GFC factor. In addition, the larger the net liabilities in debt assets, the larger the decline in net borrowing when the GFC factor deteriorates. Table 9 shows that countries with a larger gross position in debt assets are also more exposed to the GFC factor. This again only applies to countries that have positive net liabilities in debt assets.
In order to provide a quantitative perspective of the impact of net debt liabilities on factor loadings, Table 10 splits the sample into three groups: 16 countries that are net creditors in debt assets, 23 countries that have small net debt liabilities of less than 20 percent of GDP, and 19 countries that have large net debt liabilities that are bigger than 20 percent of GDP. It is this last group that is most exposed to the global …nancial cycle. Their average gross factor loading is 3.87, which is about double that of the net creditor and small net debt countries. Their average net factor loading is -0.71, versus only -0.13 for the small net debt countries. Now consider what would happen if these countries managed to eliminate their net debt liabilities. Using the coe¢ cients on (A L) debt ( ) in Table 9 for the gross and net factor loadings, respectively -3.16 and 1.31, we can compute the new average factor loadings if the net debt were eliminated. The average net debt for this group is 49 percent of GDP. Bringing this to zero, the gross factor loading would drop from 3.87 to 2.32, while the net factor loading would change from -0.71 to -0.07. These are very large changes. Net capital ‡ows would be very little a¤ected by the GFC factor, in line with the small net debt countries. Even gross capital ‡ows would be far less a¤ected, similar to creditor countries and small net debt countries. These results are also consistent with those reported in Milesi-Ferretti and Tille (2011), although they focus on the period of the global …nancial crisis and use a di¤erent methodology. They regress the annualized change in capital in ‡ows and out ‡ows from the pre-crisis period 2006Q1-2007Q2 to the crisis period 2008Q4-2009Q1 (relative to either GDP or A+L) on a variety of variables. A key …nding is that the decline in both in ‡ows and out ‡ows is larger the bigger the net liabilities in debt assets and the larger gross banking assets. They do not distinguish between net debtors and creditors.
The results so far have clear policy implications. If a country wishes to reduce its exposure to the GFC factor, it should limit the size of its net debt liabilities. Since most of these involve net banking liabilities, banking sector regulation is critical. A related policy question relates to the dilemma introduced by Rey (2013) , who argues that with a strong global …nancial cycle countries need to choose between monetary autonomy and international …nancial integration.
We …nd that what matters is not …nancial integration overall, but rather net debt liabilities. As we will see in a moment, capital controls are not statistically signi…cant in accounting for the heterogeneity in factor loadings.
The large loading on net debt liabilities makes theoretical sense. When a country has signi…cant net external debt, and borrowing constraints are tightened during the deterioration of the GFC factor, it experiences a decline in net borrowing. Borrowing constraints naturally apply to debt, not to equity and FDI. This explains the importance of net debt liabilities for the net factor loading and the capital in ‡ow loading.
The role of gross A + L positions is of interest as well. Davis and van Wincoop (2018) …nd in a two-country model that the impact of global shocks on gross capital ‡ows, scaled by A + L, does not depend on the extent of …nancial integration, measured by (A + L)=GDP . The logic behind this is that a shock that decreases external assets and liabilities by 10 percent will lower gross ‡ows by 0:1(A + L) in levels, but by 0.1 when scaled by A + L. The size of (A + L)=GDP is irrelevant. The larger the assets and liabilities, the larger the corresponding ‡ows as well. The only reason gross positions matter for gross ‡ows in Tables  8 and 9 is because of gross debt positions. We know from Milesi-Ferretti and Tille (2011) that they declined disproportionately during the global …nancial crisis. For a given (A L) debt , a higher level of (A + L) debt implies a higher value of both A debt and L debt . This means that there are larger debt assets and liabilities to reverse when creditors in all countries tighten borrowing constraints. This leads to a larger scale decline in both debt in ‡ows and out ‡ows, without a¤ecting net ‡ows. Finally consider the other variables in Tables 8 and 9 . Capital controls have no explanatory power for both the gross factor loading and the net factor loading. This suggests that simply imposing larger capital controls to mitigate the exposure to global capital ‡ow drivers will generally not be helpful. In ‡ation matters most for the net factor loading. The results imply that countries with higher in ‡ation see a larger decline in net out ‡ows (or increase in net in ‡ows) when the GFC factor deteriorates. An explanation for this may be that during a period of deterioration of the global …nancial cycle, investors become relatively more concerned with risks associated with …nancial institutions (e.g. leverage) and therefore become relatively less concerned with in ‡ation. This can lead to higher net ‡ows to countries with relatively high in ‡ation. Finally, an exchange rate peg tends to increase the sensitivity of gross ‡ows, but not net ‡ows, to the GFC factor. Giving up monetary autonomy will therefore not lead to larger volatility of net capital ‡ows that may increase business cycle volatility.
The trade variables are sometimes marginally signi…cant, but this is not robust. Once we include gross and net positions in debt assets for countries with positive net liabilities in debt assets (the sixth and eighth columns of Table 9 ), both gross and net factor loadings do not depend on X + M or X M as a fraction of GDP. Per capita GDP has an e¤ect on gross factor loadings, but not on net factor loadings. The results imply that gross ‡ows to poorer countries are less exposed to the GFC factor, while economic development has little e¤ect on the exposure of net ‡ows to the GFC factor. The only regional dummy variables that are signi…cant are the Eastern European dummy and the Latin America dummy. Particularly the Eastern European dummy is important. These countries tend to be more sensitive to the GFC factor. Many of these countries had net debt liabilities, which a¤ected them as well. But it does not fully explain the ampli…ed impact of the GFC factor on the Eastern European countries. 20 Table 11 reports results to account for the heterogeneity of the factor loadings associated with the commodity price factor. We regress on four fuel related variables. The …rst two are exports and imports of fuel as a share of GDP. The third one is crude oil consumption as a fraction of GDP, while the last is crude oil production as a fraction of GDP. The main e¤ect of these variables is on the net factor loading. Higher fuel exports leads to higher net capital out ‡ows when the commodity price factor rises. This makes sense as some of the additional revenue when fuel prices rise will be invested abroad or used to borrow less abroad. The latter appears most relevant as in ‡ows drop, while the e¤ect on out ‡ows is not statistically signi…cant. Crude oil consumption plays a role as well. A country that consumes more crude oil as a fraction of GDP has a larger capital in ‡ow loading. This means that when oil prices rise, there will be higher capital in ‡ows. There will also be higher net capital in ‡ows as the net factor loading is signi…cant and negative. Imports of fuel and production of crude oil are never statistically signi…cant.
Heterogeneity of Commodity Price Factor Loadings
We also include the same variables as in the …rst column of Table 8 . The external asset and liability variables (A + L)=GDP and (A L)=GDP are not statistically signi…cant. Neither are the trade variables (X + M )=GDP and (X M )=GDP . In ‡ation is again signi…cant. Higher in ‡ation countries experience larger capital in ‡ows, as well as net in ‡ows, when oil prices rise. We also see that Eastern Europe and Latin America experience a larger increase in net capital in ‡ows when oil prices rise. Overall though, the fuel variables are most important in explaining the heterogeneity of the net factor loading, as one would expect. They raise the adjusted R 2 from 14 percent to 33 percent for the net factor loading.
Additional Explanatory Variables
We have considered a substantial number of additional explanatory variables by adding variables, one at a time, to the regressions in columns 5 and 7 of Table 9 and columns 6 and 8 of Table 11 . The results are shown in Table 12 , where we report the estimated coe¢ cient for that variable, its standard error and the overall adjusted R 2 of the regression. The extra explanatory variables we consider are: a measure of the strength of institutions, a measure of a country's credit rating, an index of …nancial development, a country's average merchandise tari¤ rate, the average government budget de…cit, the corporate tax rate, an index of press freedom, the secondary school attainment rate, a Western Europe dummy, an Asia dummy, a measure of the growth of private domestic credit, the stock of central bank foreign exchange reserves, a measure of bank soundness, and the previous measure of capital controls squared. We include the latter in order to check for possible non-linearity associated with the e¤ect of capital controls. All of these variables and their sources are described in detail in the data appendix. Most variables have no e¤ect. The secondary school attainment rate and the growth in private sector credit have an e¤ect on the gross loadings for the …rst factor, but they do not have a signi…cant e¤ect on net loadings. Similarly, press freedom, the stock of foreign exchange reserves, and bank soundness have a signi…cant e¤ect on gross loadings for the second factor, but do not have signi…cant e¤ects on net loadings or gross loadings for the GFC factor. Finally, the squared capital controls variable also has no explanatory power. This suggests that even large capital controls will not necessarily weaken exposure to global capital ‡ow drivers.
Sensitivity Analysys: Quarterly Data
In the Online Appendix we replicate all tables and …gures using quarterly data over the same 20 years. We …nd that the results do not change qualitatively, but do change quantitatively.
The results remain qualitative similar in several ways. First, we continue to …nd that there are two main global factors driving capital ‡ows, that the …rst factor is highly correlated with the Miranda-Aggrippino and Rey global …nancial cycle factor and the second is highly correlated with the average of crude oil and natural gas prices. Second, we continue to …nd that for the entire set of countries the GFC factor is the dominant driver of gross capital ‡ows, while the two factors are equally important drivers of net capital ‡ows. Within advanced countries the GFC factor remains most important, especially for gross ‡ows but also for net ‡ows. Within emerging markets the two factors are about equally important, with the GFC factor being somewhat more important for gross ‡ows and the commodity price factor somewhat more important for net ‡ows. Finally, the key …ndings with regards to the drivers of the heterogeneity of factor loadings continue to hold up as well.
But quantitatively, the two factors explain a much smaller share of the variance of capital ‡ows when using quarterly data. This is the result of the higher degree of measurement error in quarterly capital ‡ow data. The increased noise weakens the common component. In Table  5 we report that these two global factors on average explain about 40 percent of the variance of gross and net capital ‡ows when calculated using annual data. When using quarterly data, the two factors explain around 25 percent of the variance of gross and net capital ‡ows. these large gross positions, together with the sudden sharp retrenchment of capital in ‡ows and out ‡ows during the global …nancial crisis, have lead to a refocus of the literature away from net international capital ‡ows to gross capital ‡ows. While capital in ‡ows and out ‡ows have become a lot more volatile, net capital ‡ows have not. This re ‡ects the increasing co-movement between capital in ‡ows and out ‡ows, especially in advanced countries. To the extent that in ‡ows and out ‡ows move in lockstep, they do not a¤ect net capital ‡ows. They may therefore not be of concern to policy makers as it is primarily net capital ‡ows that impact the real economy by …nancing consumption and investment. However, as we have documented here, gross ‡ows and net ‡ows are in fact closely connected to each other. Global drivers of gross ‡ows also have a signi…cant e¤ect on net capital ‡ows.
In order to consider the joint impact of global drivers on both gross and net capital ‡ows, we have estimated a factor model for 58 countries. We have identi…ed two global factors, the GFC factor and the commodity price factor. The former is closely connected to the global …nancial cycle, which in turn is closely related to changes in global perceptions of risk and risk-aversion, while the latter is closely associated with oil and gas prices. We …nd that these factors not only have signi…cant explanatory power for gross capital ‡ows, but also for net capital ‡ows. For the average country, forty percent of the variance of net capital ‡ows is explained by these two global factors, with the GFC factor contributing equally to net capital ‡ow volatility as the commodity price factor. The large impact of these global factors on net capital ‡ows re ‡ects various types of heterogeneity across countries. This heterogeneity is rather obvious for commodity price shocks as the extent of fuel exports and consumption naturally varies across countries. But it also applies to global risk shocks that drive the global …nancial cycle as countries have di¤erent exposures to …nancial sector risks. Mitigating these exposures is a natural objective for policy makers to limit the impact of global shocks on their real economies. In order to shed light on the heterogeneity across countries in the sensitivity of capital ‡ows to the global factors, we have regressed the factor loadings on a wide set of variables related to trade and …nancial integration, macroeconomic policy and conditions, institutional quality, …nancial development, exchange rate system and regulation. We …nd that most variables do not have signi…cant explanatory power. But a key …nding is that critical variables in accounting for the heterogeneous gross and net capital ‡ows loadings for the GFC factor are debt assets plus liabilities and net debt liabilities. Moreover, this sensitivity only applies to countries with positive net debt liabilities (not to net creditors). Exposure to other asset classes (portfolio equity and FDI) does not play a signi…cant role. Global changes in risk and risk perceptions can lead to a cycle of tightening and softening of credit constraints that speci…cally impact countries with positive net debt liabilities. Larger net debt liabilities lead to a larger decline in net capital in ‡ows during a risk o¤ period.
Several policy lessons can be drawn from our analysis. First, reducing exposure to external …nancial sector risks, particularly in the form of large net external debt liabilities, will limit the impact of the global …nancial cycle on net capital ‡ows. Financial sector regulation, especially bank regulation, is therefore an e¤ective way to limit exposure to the global …nancial cycle. Second, most other policy variables, such as capital controls, the exchange rate system, …scal policy and reserve accumulation, do not limit the impact of the global …nancial cycle on net capital ‡ows. These …ndings also provide a di¤erent perspective on the debate regarding trade-o¤s between monetary autonomy and …nancial integration initiated by Rey (2013) . Weakening exposure to the global …nancial cycle, thus allowing monetary authorities to re-focus on traditional concerns about in ‡ation, is not necessarily achieved through capital controls. Instead, …nancial sector regulation that limits exposure to net debt liabilities is a more e¤ective way to insulate net capital ‡ows from the global risk-on, risk-o¤ cycle.
A Data Appendix
There are two types of data we consider. The capital ‡ow data is used as a time series, and we construct a balanced panel of annual or quarterly capital ‡ow data over the 1996-2015 period for the 58 countries in the annual sample or the 50 countries in the quarterly sample
The explanatory variables that we consider when looking at heterogeneity across the loadings is constructed as cross-sectional, not time-series data. If the data is available in the time series we take the average of this data over the 1996-2015 period to construct country-speci…c observations of each variable.
A.1 Data collected as a time-series
Capital out ‡ows and in ‡ows, OF and IF : Collected from the IMF International Financial Statistics Balance of Payments data, BPM6. The capital in ‡ows and out ‡ows are then normalized by the stock of external assets and liabilities, which are also collected from the IMF's International Financial Statistics, International Investment Position, BPM6. The one exception to this is in Section 3 we also present results after normalizing net ‡ows by GDP. When estimating the factor model, all ‡ows are normalized by external assets and liabilities.
Both the Balance of Payments and International Investment position data are disaggregated into FDI, portfolio equity, portfolio debt, other (which mainly consists of bank lending), and o¢ cial reserve asset accumulation (only part of capital out ‡ows or assets). Only in Section 3 do we brie ‡y report statistics about the subcomponents of capital ‡ows, in the rest of the paper all subcomponents of capital ‡ows are aggregated into total capital out ‡ows and in ‡ows. When examining heterogeneity across factor loadings we do consider the International Investment Position data divided into its subcomponents (to be discussed later in this appendix).
Miranda-Agrippino and Rey Global Financial Cycle factor: This MAR factor is only used when plotted in Figure 4 alongside our …rst factor. We plot the MAR factor (from the short series) after normalizing the factor to have a mean zero and a standard deviation one, and then taking the average factor over each year.
Oil/Gas price: This oil/gas price is only used when plotted in Figure 4 alongside our second factor. The plotted series is the average of the West Texas Intermediate crude oil price and the Henry Hub Natural Gas price, where both series have been normalized to have a mean zero and a standard deviation one.
A.2 Data collected in cross-section only
These data series are used in the Section 6 as explanatory variables to explain the crosssectional heterogeneity of the estimated factor loadings.
External Assets and Liabilities: This is collected from the IMF International Financial Statistics, International Investment Position, BPM6. The IIP series is normalized by nominal GDP and the A and L variables in the regressions are the average values of these IIP series over the 1996-2015 period. The IIP data is disaggregated into FDI, portfolio equity, portfolio debt, and other (which mainly consists of bank lending). In Table 8 we only consider aggregate A and L, but in Table 9 we consider FDI, portfolio equity and debt (portfolio debt plus other plus central bank foreign exchange reserves) separately.
Exports and Imports: X and M include goods and services exports and imports and are collected from the IMF Internal Financial Statistics, Balance of Payments, BPM6.
GDP per capita: Nominal GDP (in USD) from IMF International Financial Statistics divided by population from the UN Population Statistics.
In ‡ation: The year-over-year percentage change in consumer prices, from the IMF International Financial Statistics.
Regional dummy variables: The assignment of regional dummy variables for Western Europe, Eastern Europe, Asia, and Latin America is described in Table 1 .
Exchange Rate Peg: Using the binomial exchange rate classi…cation system from Shambaugh (2004), using his data updated through 2014, the explanatory variable P eg is the fraction of years over the 1996-2014 period that the country had a pegged exchange rate. We do not distinguish between soft and hard pegs.
Fuel Exports and Imports: Total fuel exports and fuel imports normalized by nominal GDP, from World Bank's World Development Indicators.
Barrels of Crude Oil Production and Consumption: Numbers of barrels per day of crude oil consumption and production, multiplied by the price per barrel of West Texas Intermediate, normalized by nominal GDP, from U.S. Energy Information Administration.
Institutions (5) Argentina (3) Thailand (2) Singapore (2) Armenia (1) Ukraine (4) Australia (2) Bangladesh (2) Uruguay (3) Canada (5) Bolivia (3) Venezuela (3) Switzerland (1) Brazil (3) South Africa (5) Germany (1) Chile (3) Albania (4) Denmark (1) China (2) Czech Republic (4) Spain (1) Colombia (3) Estonia (4) Finland (1) Fiji (2) Croatia (4) France (1) Honduras (3) Hungary (4) United Kingdom (1) Indonesia (2) Lithuania (4) Iceland (1) India (2) Latvia (4) Israel (5) Jordan (5) Poland (4) Italy (1) Moldova (4) Romania (4) Japan (2) Mexico (3) Slovakia (4) Korea (2) Pakistan (2) Slovenia (4) The Netherlands (1) Peru (3) Turkey (4) Norway (1) Philippines (2) Sri Lanka (2) Portugal (1) Paraguay (3) Sweden ( Notes: The goodness of …t statistics are calculated from a factor model using annual data over the period 1996-2015. Capital ‡ows normalized by the stock of external assets plus liabilities. Note: ***/**/* denotes signi…cance at the 1/5/10% level. Notes: Each regression has 58 observations. The factors are computed using data over the period 1996-2015. The variables A and L are the stocks of external assets and liabilities normalized by GDP. When a gross or net asset position is followed by a (+) all country observations where the net position is negative are replaced by zeros. When followed by a (-) all country observations that are positive are replaced by zeros. X and M are exports and imports divided by GDP. GDPpc is the log of per capita GDP, In ‡ation is the average annualized in ‡ation rate over the period, EastEurope and LatAm are dummies if the country is in Eastern Europe or Latin America (see Table 1 ). Peg is the fraction of time over the 20 year period when the country had a pegged exchange rate, as de…ned by Shambaugh. CapControls is the Chinn-Ito capital account openness index. ***/**/* denote signi…cance at the 1/5/10% levels. e x te rn a l a sse ts a n d lia b ilitie s, a n d th e su p e rsc rip t P E d e n o te p o rtfo lio e q u ity e x te rn a l a sse ts a n d lia b ilitie s. Notes: See notes to Table 8 . X f uel and M f uel are fuel exports and imports, as a share of GDP. BBL con and BBL pro are crude oil consumption and production, measured in barrels per day multipled by the price of WTI crude oil, normalized by GDP. ***/**/* denote signi…cance at the 1/5/10% levels. Notes: The base regression in the case of the GFC factor is the regression speci…cation in columns 5 and 7 of Table 9 , and the base regression in the case of the commodity price factor is the regression in columns 6 and 8 of Table 11 .
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